Experimental life science in the twentieth century is aptly characterized as a quest for "master molecules", biochemical entities presumed to govern all basic vital processes and phenomena. Today many commentators critique the reigning "genetic essentialism"-the notion that everything about the life of human beings (and other living things) is predetermined in their DNA, today's master molecule.' However, notwithstanding efforts by early geneticists to promote the gene, present fashion must not make us forget that in the first half of the twentieth century, hormones took pride of place as life's master molecules, and the endocrinologist took precedence over the geneticist as the scientist offering the means to control life. For such are the inherent implications of master molecules: to discover and manipulate these substances is to acquire the means to control the vital processes and phenomena governed by them. The master molecule thus constitutes an intersection between intellectual, therapeutic, and commercial interests, naturally attracting the most ambitious participants in biomedical science and industry. And indeed, many ethical pharmaceutical companies in the inter-war era-driven in the United States and
Nicolas Rasmussen other countries by a medical profession eager to shed old nostrums for new remedies bearing the stamp of laboratory science-did bring a remarkable variety of (comparatively) pure hormone preparations to market for an even more remarkable range of clinical indications. In the process, drug firms avidly supported the hormone research of leading physiologists and biochemists, forging new ties between academic life science and biomedical industry that helped shape the future development of pharmaceuticals.2 Since the power and promise extravagantly attributed to genes today echo those surrounding hormones half a century ago (not to mention the advantages and drawbacks of the scientist-industrialist collaborations created to harness the power of life's master molecules), we may have much to learn from studying earlier endocrinological dreams.
To help recapture the heady atmosphere of medical, scientific and commercial enthusiasm surrounding hormones in the first half of the twentieth century, and the scientist-industrialist collaborations it spawned, in the following essay I trace Edward C Kendall's research on the hormones of the adrenal cortex in the 1930s and 1940s. This story illustrates well all three aspects of endocrine research in the period noted above: the nearly unlimited power over life processes ascribed to hormones; the immense medical and commercial promise perceived to lie in hormones; and the intimate interactions between top-level life scientists and the drug industry in the inter-war period generated by the effort to bring hormone therapeutics to market, which continued right through the war despite the strong involvement of government science agencies. Because the concluding part of the story, in which the American government organized and sponsored a crash programme to develop the cortical hormones as performance-enhancing drugs for combat pilots, may throw new light on the nature of state management of life science and industry during the war, it will be treated in particular detail. I argue that, in this field of biomedicine at least, the discontinuities in the practice of research introduced by war were not so great as envisioned by commentators who see the Second World War as a watershed for American science, proposing, for instance, that the larger government-sponsored projects set new precedent by "transgressing and reshaping" "boundaries ... between public knowledge and private profit" and bringing "Big 2John P Swann, Academic scientists and the 1982; Nelly Oudshoorn, Beyond the natural body:
Steroids in Arms Science" to life science as well as physics.3 On the contrary, the scientific, medical and commercial promise of the master molecules had already made endocrinology into "Big Science" before the war, and wartime government involvement in the field did little to change this.
The Hormone Business in America, 1900 America, -1930 From the late nineteenth century to the 1940s, endocrinology was one of the most dynamic areas of biomedical research, despite a certain aura of quackery that gathered around the field in its earliest years, generated precisely by its perceived promise (which provoked a proliferation of unrefined organ extract treatments for popular ailments such as impotence and hysteria). Together with bacteriology, endocrinology was one of the first areas in which the life sciences established their direct utility in clinical medicine, with the milestone 1891 demonstration that extract of thyroid glands was effective in treating the well-defined clinical deficiency condition myxoedema. By the 1920s, a high calibre of laboratory research had elevated the stature of the field, and a standard pattern for hormone research programmes had coalesced. Typically, a deficiency condition was created in an experimental animal (ideally, a condition with clear similarities to a human disease) by surgical removal of an endocrine organ, and then chemical extracts of the organ were prepared from slaughterhouse waste or other abundant sources and tested for their capacity to remedy the experimental animals' condition. Testicular extract was tested for its ability to promote comb growth in capons, for example, and pancreatic extract for its ability to prevent diabetic symptoms in dogs whose pancreas had been excised. Once a preparation procedure was developed that yielded extracts active in treating the deficiency condition of the experimental animals, efforts turned to concentrating and purifying the active compound(s) by chemically fractionating the organ extract, 3 'Derek De Solla Price, Little science, big science ... and beyond, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986. For a sample of the classic literature on the Second World War and the changes it brought to physical sciences, see A Hunter Dupree, 'The great instauration of 1940: the organization of scientific research for war', in Gerald Holton (ed.), The twentieth century sciences: studies in the biography of ideas, New York, Norton, 1972, pp. 443-67 ; contributions in Paul Forman and Jose M Sinchez-Ron (eds), National military establishments and the advancement of science and technology, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1996; and contributions in Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly (eds), Big science: the growth of large-scale research, Stanford University Press, 1992; see also James Capshew and Karen Rader, 'Big science: price to the present ', Osiris, 1992, 7: 3-25; Daniel Kevles, The physicists: the history of a scientific community in modern America, New York, Knopf, 1978 ; Paul Forman, 'Behind quantum electronics: national security as basis for physical research in the United States, 1940 -1960 ', Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 1987 149-229; and Nathan Reingold, 'Science and government in the United States since 1945', Hist. Sci., 1994, 32: 361-86. On life sciences during and after the Second World War treated according to the same model, see, for example, Jean-Paul Gaudilliere, 'The molecularization of cancer etiology in the postwar United States: instruments, politics and management', in Soraya de Chadarevian and Harmke Kamminga (eds), Molecularizing biology and medicine: new practices and alliances, 1910s-1970s, Amsterdam, Harwood, 1998 and Angela Creager, 'Biotechnology and blood: Edwin Cohn's plasma fractionation project, 1940-1953', in Thackray, op. cit., note 1 above, pp. 39-62, quotes on pp. 41, 44. at every step using bio-assay with the experimental animals to detect the fraction containing hormone activity. Success was marked by crystallization of a pure, highly active compound presumed to be the native hormone on the basis of its full substitution, in the experimental animals, for the gland removed. Analysis of the hormone's chemical structure and properties followed, and, if technologically feasible, the analysis would be confirmed by chemically synthesizing a compound of the proposed structure and showing the synthetic material to have hormone activity identical to natural organ extracts in the standard bio-assay. The growing chemical sophistication of endocrinology research brought biochemists into ever-closer collaborations with physiologists, or else into physiological research themselves. Indeed, such work in endocrinology was a major driving force in the development of biochemical methods, and in the rising status of biochemistry, during the first decades of the twentieth century.4
The typical trajectory of hormone research just outlined constituted not only a programme for the advancement of biomedical knowledge during the inter-war years, but simultaneously a plan for commercial drug development. As noted, from the earliest days of endocrinology, more or less active extracts of a variety of organs were marketed for use by physicians: most notoriously testes extracts for the treatment of flagging virility, but also extracts of ovaries, pancreas, thyroid glands, and adrenals. From 1897 to 1901, the blood-pressure-raising hormone epinephrine was isolated from adrenal glands, and was quickly brought to market in relatively pure form with great success by Parke-Davis Company, under its trade name "Adrenaline". In 1915, chemically pure thyroid hormone highly active in treatment of myxoedema was isolated, and soon found its way into the marketplace for a variety of conditions.5 The 1922 advent of insulin, saving millions of diabetics from the prospect of early and lingering deaths, vividly confirmed the medical and commercial potential of endocrinology, and raised the competitive tempo of the field. The drug had been developed through a mutually profitable collaboration between the Eli Lilly firm and the University of Toronto, site of the crucial research on isolating the pancreatic hormone. Lilly's spectacular success brought many other drug companies into closer collaboration with enterprising endocrinologists in an effort to repeat the insulin 4On the pattern of scientific investigation into the active principles of the endocrine glands to the early 1920s, see W F Bynum, "'C'est un malade": animal models and concepts of human diseases', J. Hist. Med Allied Sci., 1990, 45: story with the hormones of other organs, and even spurred the establishment of whole new endocrine firms, such as Organon in Holland. In these growing collaborations between pharmaceutical companies and academic life scientists in hormone research (and in the neighbouring field of vitamins), drug firms sought access to novel scientifically validated therapeutics, and the scientists garnered material assistance for their research. The level of hormonal enthusiasm among drug firms and enterprising scientists prompted at least one contemporary commentator to describe this situation in endocrinology of the 1920s and 1930s as a "gold rush".6
On both the biochemical and commercial fronts of endocrinology, Edward C Kendall of the Mayo Clinic and Foundation could safely be described as a trailblazer. For three years after his 1910 Columbia University doctorate in chemistry, received at the age of twenty-four for work on a starch-degrading enzyme isolated from pancreas, Kendall had struggled against a widespread attitude of physicians and drug firms alike that biochemists were suited only to service roles. Finding a haven at the Mayo Clinic in 1914 as head of that institution's new biochemistry section, Kendall proved his vision that biochemical research could advance practical therapeutics with the crystallization of the thyroid hormone, named "thyroxine" by him, within his first year there. The discovery was trumpeted in the press as a medical triumph, bringing prestige to the Mayo and elevating Kendall's scientific reputation. In 1916, well before his definitive 1919 paper on the chemical attributes of thyroxine, Kendall had patented his thyroid hormone preparation method and assigned this intellectual property to the University of Minnesota, which had affiliated with the Mayo Clinic when the two entities jointly established the Mayo Foundation in 1915 as a (non-profit) teaching institution of the University's medical school. In 1919, the University granted an exclusive licence for use of Kendall's patent to the Squibb pharmaceutical firm in exchange for 50 per cent of profits from the product, which Squibb successfully marketed. Kendall's thyroxine and other less pure thyroid hormone preparations became popular drugs in the inter-war years, not just for myxoedema and other hypothyroid conditions, but also, because of their general metabolism-stimulating effects, for a wide range of disorders including constipation, menstrual disorders and even for weight control in "those who enjoy food to the extent that obesity is preferable to self-denial".7 'David Hamilton, The monkey gland affair, London, Chatto & Windus, 1986 ; Merriley Borell, 'Brown-Sequard's organotherapy and its appearance in America at the end of the nineteenth century', Bull. Hist. Med., 1976, 50: 309-20; Nelly Oudshoorn, 'United we stand: the pharmaceutical industry, laboratory, and clinic in the development of sex hormones into scientific drugs, 1920 -1940 ', Science, Technology and Human Values, 1993 The royalties to the University of Minnesota from Kendall's thyroxine patent were placed in a special fund for Kendall to draw on for research expenditures. This arrangement seems to have satisfied all parties, and was widely considered a success, representing, perhaps, the triumph of the utilitarian ethic of chemists over the Hippocratic ideals of physicians. In 1922, when Toronto physiologist J J R Macleod sought Kendall's advice on whether to patent the insulin preparation procedure developed by Frederick Banting, Charles Best, and James Collip in his laboratory, Kendall explained the thyroxine arrangements, and offered Macleod his business and ethical advice as well ("I can see no more reason why the man that separates the active constituent of the pancreas should not share financially as much as the man that makes a new wireless telephone"). As noted, the Toronto group did patent their insulin production method, granting Lilly an exclusive licence for a limited period to compensate the firm for its investment in the development of the drug. The biochemist Harry Steenbock of the University of Wisconsin also emulated Kendall, establishing a separate foundation when the University refused to manage his vitamin D preparation patent directly.8 Kendall's thyroxine invention and patent arrangements served as a paradigm of entrepreneurial life science in the inter-war period, showing how a medical investigator might benefit his own research and his institution, while at the same time benefiting mankind by ensuring that his discovery was manufactured and distributed by a reputable drug firm, in conformity with the highest quality standards.
The Biochemist-Entrepreneur Faces the Great Depression For several years after his decade-long quest to prove the structure he had proposed for thyroxine was foiled by a competitor in 1926, Kendall's research wandered among several short-term projects. However, in 1930 he set his sights on a new major objective: purifying and characterizing the hormone of the adrenal cortex, with an eye to discovering a commercially feasible production method along the way. Belief in an essential hormone of the adrenal cortex, as opposed to the adrenal medulla from which epinephrine had been isolated at the turn of the century, was surprisingly new at this point. It was not until the late 1920s that accumulating evidence began to convince the medical profession that epinephrine was not an effective treatment of Addison's disease, the deadly condition caused by acute adrenal insufficiency, and iodine compound which occurs in the thyroid', e.g. Louis Goodman and Alfred Gilman, The J. Biol. Chem., 1919, 39: 125-47 Kendall, op. cit., note 6 above, ch. 6.
Kendall had been deliberately developing extraction methods for cortical hormones which simultaneously permitted good recovery of epinephrine from the adrenal medulla, in order that sale of this by-product might defray a major part of the expenses of his research programme. In the wake of his crystallization breakthrough and the increased standing it brought, in 1934 Kendall approached the president of Parke-Davis, which (as noted above) had built a lucrative trade in its name-brand "Adrenaline" preparation, with a proposition to supply the firm with epinephrine on an industrial scale in exchange for a continuous supply of adrenal glands. ParkeDavis agreed to provide 500 pounds per week of fresh frozen adrenals to Kendall's laboratory at the Mayo if Kendall would deliver epinephrine in the quantity normally yielded, and meeting the firm's standards of purity. Epinephrine exceeding the expected yield could be sold for cash by Kendall. In order to hedge against possible costs incurred if he were not to meet his yield benchmark, the enterprising Kendall struck another bargain with Wilson Laboratories of Chicago, a pharmaceutical subsidiary of the Wilson meat-packing firm which produced therapeutic organ preparations. Wilson agreed to provide 300 pounds per week of fresh frozen adrenals in exchange for standardization of the potency of the firm's cortical extracts by Kendall's Mayo group, which had refined the relevant bio-assays to a high degree. Kendall tripled his technical staff so he could keep what he aptly called his "pilotplant factory" running around the clock in three 8-hour shifts, six days per week, and his laboratory continued work on this scale for some thirteen years, processing nearly two tons of adrenal glands per month when operating at capacity.1" Kendall soon became the chief source of purified cortical hormones in North America, and Mayo the leading site for clinical treatment of adrenal insufficiency, although cruder commercial extracts were available to clinicians everywhere. Patients suffering acute Addison's disease present some of the following symptoms: mental fatigue, a sense of weakness accompanied by measurable decline in aerobic capacity and muscle strength, loss of appetite and wasting, declining blood volume and flow rate associated with excess sodium excretion through the kidneys together with potassium and urea retention in the blood. Death often comes when these symptoms culminate in circulatory collapse. However, treatment of the comparatively uncommon Addison's disease, which was growing ever rarer with the decline of its chief cause, tuberculosis, does not suffice to explain the high level of scientific and commercial interest in the hormones of the adrenal cortex. Many doctors and physiologists reasoned that even in patients with functional adrenal glands, Addison's-like symptoms such as muscular weakness, mental fatigue, or reduced resistance to cold might be alleviated by cortical hormone therapy. And in short order after the invention and 1931 commercial introduction of cortical extracts " E C Kendall, 'A study of the suprarenal Clinic, 1933, 8: initially to controversy over the true role of "the hormone" of the adrenal cortex. However, in the mid-1930s, the dispute over whether cortin was a "general tissue hormone" stimulating all cell types (as Hartman thought), or a hormone specifically controlling the balance of fluid and mineral electrolytes in tissue, or a hormone specifically regulating carbohydrate metabolism, began to give way to a realization that the adrenal cortex might control a variety of distinct physiological functions through several different hormones. In 1937 most attention was focused on the effects of cortical hormones on mineral metabolism (i.e. sodium and potassium in blood and other fluids) and its influence on circulatory collapse through fluid loss. Indeed, at a Cold Spring Harbor symposium that year all the major players, including Kendall, seemed prepared to accept that the adrenal cortex's influence on carbohydrate metabolism was merely a secondary effect of cortin's influence on minerals, or else the effect of another cortical hormone not essential for life. The one dissenter still insisting on the primacy of carbohydrate metabolism, and particularly the dependence of blood glucose and glycogen stores on cortical activity, the physiologist S W Britton of the University of Virginia medical school, met with general scepticism there. A key reason for this scepticism lay in the failure of cortical extract to produce diabetes-like conditions in animals both adrenalectomized and pancreatectomized (which, paradoxically, appeared to be spared diabetes by the absence of the adrenals). However, later in 1937, the group of the Yale physiologist Cyril Long was finally able to reproduce diabetes in such adrenalectomized-pancreatectomized animals by using stronger extracts obtained from Kendall. Evidence now supported a crucial role for the cortical hormone (or one of these hormones) in carbohydrate metabolism."6
In that same year, 1937, Reichstein stunned his competitors with a barrage of papers describing a variety of active compounds isolated from extracts provided by Organon, one of which he dubbed "corticosterone" in the expectation that the hormone, which affected sugar as well as mineral metabolism to some extent, was either Hartman's long-sought cortin or a close relative. His group also achieved synthesis of the related compound desoxycorticosterone, with a much higher activity on mineral metabolism than his corticosterone, by a commercially practical method. Clinical trials soon demonstrated that desoxycorticosterone did effectively maintain the life of Addison's patients in the same way as dietary control of minerals, but did not relieve lassitude and other symptoms associated with carbohydrate metabolism. Together with Long's results, these findings left little doubt that the hormones ofthe adrenal cortex active in mineral metabolism and in energy metabolism were distinct. And, since desoxycorticosterone did not fulfil this other, energy-related role of the cortex, another hormone drug still remained to be developed. Presumably this elusive hormone, active in regulating carbohydrate metabolism, would be a "See articles and discussions on adrenal and adrenal glands upon pancreatic diabetes', hormones in Cold Spring Harbor Symp.
Harvey Lect., 1936-37, 32: 194-228; Quant. Biol., 1937, 5 A week or two ago, we had a confidential report from Buenos Aires that the German Government had just purchased 50 tons of adrenal tissue from the Argentine, which is being shipped to Germany via Japan. We have, therefore, felt impelled to take energetic steps to see in what direction adrenal extract may be useful to the aviator.20
Given the state of physiological knowledge about adrenal hormones, coinciding with the early successes of Germany's Blitzkrieg and rampant speculations about the secret weapons enabling it, tales of Nazis shipping adrenal glands by U-boat for use by their pilots were understandably greeted with alarm rather than scepticism (illfounded though those tales later proved to be Press, 1997. they agreed that Clark should receive full progress reports, including proprietary knowledge, from all research teams and to decide when one of them had progressed to the point where the others needed to be informed and redirected in order to prevent needless duplication of effort. The group also concurred that the supply of adrenal glands was insufficient to meet any but research needs, that the problem of synthesizing a substance with an oxygen at carbon 11 of the steroid nucleus was the key to making Compound E available on a commercial scale, and that they would make work on this synthetic problem a top priority.22
Clark and Richards immediately began organizing more chemists to pursue the synthetic production of Compound E (as described below), and in late 1941 the CMR also initiated physiological research contracts on adrenal hormones, many picking up work begun under NRC Aviation Medicine auspices. Gerald Evans of the University of Minnesota studied the impact of prolonged anoxia in intact animals (especially mice), in particular carbohydrate metabolism, temperature change, and morphological change in the adrenals, and also modifications of these impacts through treatment with adrenal extracts. Thorn undertook studies of carbohydrate metabolism and low pressure tolerance in a variety of experimental animals, some without adrenal glands and some normal. Hartman investigated the distinct roles of low atmospheric pressure and low oxygen on the adaptive responses of normal animals to altitude, especially those mediated by the adrenals. Henry Ricketts of the University of Chicago similarly studied the distinct effects of anoxia and low pressure, both prolonged and intermittent, on physiological changes in various organs of normal animals. Rueben Gustavson of the University of Colorado tested the effect of a wide range of steroids, including testosterone and estrogens, on the tolerance of rats to low-oxygen, high-nitrogen atmosphere. E S Sundstroem of the University of California tested the effects of intermittent and sustained anoxia on normal animals' adaptation mechanism to high altitude, especially those involving the adrenals, and the impact of adrenal extract treatments on these adaptations. And Herbert Evans of the University of California adapted his existing research programme to the war, studying the effects of his recently purified adrenocorticotropic hormone, which the brain secretes and which stimulates the adrenal cortex, on carbohydrate metabolism at various atmospheric pressures. All of these projects were aimed at learning whether treatment of aviators with adrenal cortex hormones would increase their tolerance for high altitude. In addition, several contracts with physiologists were initiated to investigate whether cortical hormones counteract traumatic or surgical shock.23 All this research was intended to assess the utility to the military of Compound E, and thus the probable wartime demand for the drug, if it proved technically and economically feasible to manufacture in quantity.
Steroids in Arms
Making the drug available in quantity would be the job of chemists and biochemists with talents in synthetic work. Kendall quickly took a number of actions to consolidate his leadership position in what was clearly going to become an even more crowded field. Two weeks after the first chemists' meeting on cortical steroids, Kendall informed Richards that he had successfully synthesized a key intermediate to Compound E and asked if the OSRD had any interest in claiming an intellectual property stake in this invention (as was typical in CMR projects). Kendall was told that since he had made his invention without government funding, patenting it would be his decision alone. A meeting with Vannevar Bush and the National Academy president Frank Jewett was immediately arranged in New York, whence Kendall flew directly from Washington. There, Bush suggested that the Research Corporation might be the best institution to manage Kendall's new patent. This non-profit agency existed to manage patents arising from academic-industrialist collaborations, finding industrial licensees for patents and funnelling royalties back to fields and to researchers specified by the research institutions and firms involved, an arms-length method allowing universities and other scientific institutions to draw financial benefits from the fruits of their research without having to commercialize the products themselves. Bush was perhaps thinking of the Research Corporation's recent handling of vitamin B patents, licensed to the Merck pharmaceutical house and made available to medicine by the firm, to contemporary acclaim.24
In any event, Bush arranged a meeting that same evening between Kendall and the Research Corporation's President Howard Poillon. A full weekend of meetings with lawyers, business executives and research managers, and bureaucrats in New York ensued. By the time Kendall returned to Minnesota the following Wednesday, less than a week after telling Richards of his new results, a bargain had formally been struck wherein the Research Corporation would apply for and manage Kendall's patent (which was to be kept secret in the interest of national defence) in exchange for assignment of the patent and half of any royalties, the other half to go into Kendall's University of Minnesota "Thyroxine Fund". Because of established relations with the Merck corporation (and probably Kendall's preference for this firm over Parke-Davis, who were courting Kendall for his cortical hormones), Poillon had arranged that Merck would be the drug firm licensed to use Kendall's patents, and to assist him in further development of methods for Compound E synthesis. This arrangement sealed, Kendall then tried to convince Clark that there was no good reason for the chemists working on cortical steroids ever to meet again, arguing that although the first meeting had been necessary to take stock, the group would never be able to work co-operatively because of commercial rivalry between Squibb, Parke-Davis, and Merck, along with "scientific competition" between Wallis, Fieser, and himself. Indeed, Kendall suggested that he had the problem well enough in hand so that no other chemists or companies (besides Merck) need be involved at Kendall' s concern that government involvement might translate into dilution or appropriation of the scientific credit he hoped to win from synthesizing Compound E-not to mention economic rewards. On this latter score at least, Kendall was reassured that the academic researchers were bound by a standard clause in their CMR contracts waiving all rights to intellectual property acquired under contract projects, except at OSRD discretion. In contrast, the industrial participants in the project, which not only included Parke-Davis and Merck but also Schering (but not Squibb, which redirected its efforts to penicillin), took no money from the OSRD and thus were not hampered by government contracts. Likewise, Kendall himself Kendall, 28 Nov. 1941 , and Poillon, draft letter 1915 -1930 ', Ambix, 1976 of understanding and draft patent assignment 26See information sheets for OEM-cmr agreement re. U.S. patent application 420,486 of contracts 32, 42, 55, 70, 95, 106, and 168, 28 Nov. 1941 Thorn confirmed that in monkeys and other animals, repeated exposure to anoxia and low pressure equivalent to 20,000-27,000 feet of altitude, physiological adaptation was accompanied by enlargement of the adrenal glands. Thorn also found that the absolute ceiling (i.e. point at which death on average occurred) of normal rats exposed to low pressures equivalent to altitudes over 30,000 feet was indeed raised by Kendall's extract; however, similar improvements in altitude tolerance could be obtained simply by preconditioning animals in atmospheres equivalent to 18,000-26,000 feet, suggesting that a training regimen might substitute for hormone treatments. Moreover, using rats on treadmills in low-oxygen conditions, Thorn found no significant increase in the "work capacity" of animals treated with Kendall's extracts (though this experiment was confounded by large variations in the individual rats' propensity to perform "work"). Evans discovered that the degree of enlargement of adrenal glands accompanying high-altitude conditioning did not correlate with the actual altitude tolerance of animals, throwing the central role of the adrenal in altitude adaptation into doubt. He also found that in dogs no adrenal extract treatments ameliorated the decline in motor and visual performance brought on by low atmospheric pressures, and that in mice Kendall's extract brought only a slight 27Major to Kendall, 3 Dec. 1941; Kendall contractors, see Clark to Richards, 9 Feb. to Major, 24 Dec. 1942;  Major to Kendall, 1942, folder 'Adrenal Cortex', box improvement in altitude tolerance (though these latter results were confounded by the strong temperature dependence of absolute ceiling in mice). Together the whole set of results suggested that Compound E and related adrenal cortex hormones affecting carbohydrate metabolism would not improve pilot performance, and although hormone treatment might have some limited utility in preventing death at extreme high altitudes, the right training regimen would be at least as effective. Nor did the physiological experiments testing the possibility of using cortical steroid treatments to prevent shock yield promising results. Richards and the CMR effectively pulled the plug, discontinuing physiological research aimed at assessing the value of cortical steroid usage in the combat theatre (though the hormones continued to play a role in some other medical research projects, for example on convalescence and healing). The negative assessment of the military potential of the hormones was reflected in the declassification of the physiological research involving them, in late 1943.28 All the chemistry groups had been pursuing methods of synthesizing Kendall Why the chemists' work was "definitely" in the national interest during wartime whether or not cortical hormones might have military applications is an intriguing question. Naturally, the hormones were intellectually interesting to a number of life scientists, but the OSRD's purpose was precisely to divert scientists away from purely intellectual goals, and toward wartime priorities. Rather than military or scientific interest in these hormones, the primary consideration behind continuation of the 28 Steroids in Arms work might well have been protecting the position of the American pharmaceutical industry in the coming peace. Bush, active in industrial policy and experienced in consulting since his early career in electrical engineering, would have been as aware of the commercial importance of methods to produce a new class of drugs as Richards, longtime consultant to Merck. And there was no secret that Reichstein was forging ahead, backed by European drug firms. While most American firms did not actually begin advertising their post-war consumer product lines until mid-1944, the issue of the post-war economy would never be far from the minds of such urbane men, even while immersed in serving the nation's war effort.
At any rate, later in 1943 the chemists received the unwelcome news, via Clark from the Swiss firm CIBA (Reichstein's industrial partner after Holland fell under German occupation), that Reichstein had beaten them all in the race to synthesize Compound A. As Kendall put it, there were "whispers" and "raised eyebrows" that the cortical hormone biochemists had made so little headway in two years, while their counterparts working on penicillin and anti-malarials had all made such excellent progress. Most of the chemists on Clark's team (with the exception of Gallagher, who was making good progress by a route different from Kendall's) quickly discontinued their contract projects, as might be expected. But even in March 1944 Richards was willing to allow continuation of the synthetic projects despite a "growing disposition within the CMR to regard the prospects of practical usefulness from the adrenal cortex contracts as remote", asking Clark to reconfirm which synthetic projects he thought were especially worthwhile. Kendall, Merck, CIBA , and other holders of rights to key steps in the industrial cortisone synthesis process so that the commercialization of the hormone could proceed. While cortisone itself was soon replaced by derivatives with fewer side-effects, the cortical steroids were a permanent benefit to medicine, and an important tool in the further elucidation of the endocrine system.33
The anti-inflammatory properties which quickly made cortisone the archetypical post-war miracle drug had been discovered through Hench's clinical intuition, and the fact that such applications not been anticipated by endocrinologists studying Compound E in animal models certainly demonstrates the limits of laboratory-based drug development research. Intriguingly, however, the use of 1930s-style whole cortical extracts to boost strength and to combat mental stress and fatigue, the prewar market for the remedy which must have shaped pharmaceutical companies' expectations of the indications drugs like cortisone would acquire, continued into the 1970s, due mainly to a medical movement promoting the extracts as a cure for hypoglycaemia (which, according to this faction, was much more widespread than orthodox opinion held).3 Thus may the misbegotten dreams of master molecules die hard, particularly when they take such a perennially attractive form as a remedy bringing happiness and strength. But this is a story for another day.
Conclusion
The story of research on the hormones of the adrenal cortex well illustrates the degree to which, in the 1910s through the 1940s, hormones were taken to be mastercontrollers of life processes (in the case of these particular hormones, of respiratory efficiency, circulation, and a variety of neural functions). It also shows how much the harnessing of hormones was thought to offer medicine through mastery over these same processes, and how thoroughly the interest in practical applications could draw hormone researchers into intimate relationships with the pharmaceutical industry-relationships more than slightly resembling those decried by recent critics of molecular biologists' involvement with biotechnology firms.35 While, unlike some entrepreneurial biologists today, the hormone researchers of the early twentieth century generally did not personally grow rich from their patents, their corporate partners did, and their universities acquired income to support their activities. Kendall and his generation of endocrinological researchers drew money and material resources from industry to support their research, for which they exchanged the intellectual property rights they acquired in the course oftheir scientific investigations. These resources could be crucial for the advancement of their endocrinological research, costly and pressed for time by competition as their research programmes often were. Furthermore, industrial partnerships represented much more than simply resources for scientists pursuing knowledge of hormones, if their ambitions also included the introduction of their hormone discoveries into medical practice. To this end, endocrinology researchers had to become active partners in the commercial endeavours of their drug company collaborators, acting in their partner's interests with respect to factors affecting the firm's likely return on investment from hormone drug development, such as avoiding patent obstacles and pursuing maximal yields in the hormone preparation methods they were developing, and maintaining the secrecy of unpatentable proprietary information.36 And as Kendall's 1950 Nobel Prize reminds us, such work was not regarded as scientifically inferior because of its commercial dimensions, according to the values of his day. However, one might well observe that Kendall was a man of his era, and that his day was passing both literally (in that he would retire within a year of receiving the Nobel prize) and figuratively. He was among the last of his particular breed of entrepreneur.
Kendall's style of entrepreneurship had served him well in the Depression. It will also be evident from this story that it served him well enough during the Second World War, government intervention causing no major interruption in his industriallyoriented hormone discovery and drug development programme. Perhaps the OSRD forced Kendall to take on a corporate partner earlier in the game than he would have in peacetime, but Merck was an ideal match for him, and he suffered no crucial loss either of intellectual property or personal scientific credit as a result of government involvement in his cortical hormone work. The discontinuation of OSRD interest in his project caused even less interruption than its initiation. This finding of continuity through the war comes as something of a surprise if one expects, following many historians of science, that government management of science during wartime, in the United States particularly by the OSRD, suddenly transformed academic physical and biomedical sciences alike into the "Big Science"-richly funded, bureaucratized, technology-intensive, large in scale, and mission-oriented in style (often with a mission related to military or industrial applications)-that became so widespread after the war. This is not the place for a general assessment of the impact of wartime government patronage on life sciences in America, but Kendall's experience suggests that in fields where "Big Science" was already the rule through pre-war industrial sponsorship, agencies like the OSRD did little beyond allowing the competitive and productive forces already in play to take their course. Certainly Bush, Richards, and Clark were solicitous of the interests of Kendall and his industrial partners at every stage of the game, from their initial decision to let 3 Kendall plainly shows all of these pathway with higher yields than that obtained by behaviours, for instance in his continuing his collaborator Sarett. His concern to keep research during 1943-44 on Compound A proprietary information secret from competitors synthesis in pursuit of a different pathway, with was evinced by his successful efforts to limit higher yields, than that already developed (and information exchange among the OSRD patented) by Reichstein, and by his continued collaborators on Compound E, described above. pursuit in 1945 of a Compound E synthesis See Kendall, op. cit., note 6 above, ch. 11.
Steroids in Arms
Kendall keep his patent application and other competitive information secret from other participants in the cortical steroid project, to their decision to allow Kendall the special privileges of a CMR contractor well beyond their mid-1943 conclusion that his hormones were unlikely to contribute to the war effort. Perhaps this should come as no surprise, since Bush was no socialist, and accomplishing national goals through the voluntary participation of private enterprise was his agency's essential strategy for recruiting science to the war effort.37 Though Kendall's cortical hormone work through the 1930s and 1940s illustrates how well established industrially-sponsored "Big Science" already was before the war in certain fields of biomedical research holding promise for pharmaceutical companies, in the post-war era the expansion of government patronage did bring a real change to the character of research even in these precocious fields. In 1950, when the National Science Foundation was finally established in the United States after years of debate on its exact form, the annual research budget of the National Institutes of Health had already exceeded the entire wartime budget of the CMR and was doubling every year or two.38 In this new era, federal funding for basic research quickly overshadowed what was available from private enterprise, and the industrial collaborations that allowed Kendall to do technology-rich and labourintensive work on a grand scale through three decades became unnecessary for the biomedical generation that followed his. The rising influence of government science agencies in the 1950s brought the peer-reviewed grant to dominance and, until recently, discouraged industrial collaborations, at least in biomedical science. It is to the post-war science agencies that we must look to explain some aspects of the discontinuities that appear, in hindsight, to have been brought to science by the Second World War. Much historical work remains to be done on these agencies and their influence in the life sciences in the post-war period.39 But notwithstanding these changes that made peer-reviewed government funding the rule, and despite the eclipse of the hormone by the gene in the second half of the twentieth century, we must recall that earlier age when entrepreneurial life scientists like Kendall reigned supreme-an age which included the war years themselves-if we wish to learn any lessons that this past might teach us about our current preoccupations with today's master molecules. The first such lesson might be that industrial collaborations do not always represent an insuperable obstacle to biomedical research of the highest calibre.
